

# **THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST**

15 FEB. 1962


~~TOP SECRET~~

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1. Berlin: events in  
the air corridors  
this morning

There was much Soviet activity in the corridors during the "reserved" period. All scheduled Allied flights passed through safely, but a number of incidents occurred. These included at least the following (reporting was not complete as of 0830):


a. A USAF C-124 was signalled to land by a Soviet fighter



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b. A French transport was ordered by the Soviet controller in the Air Safety Center not to leave Berlin or it would be turned back. The aircraft took off on General Norstad's order and arrived in West Germany. We do not yet know if it met any interference.

c. A Pan-American transport was intercepted, but "waved on" by the Soviet pilot.



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**2. Berlin air corridors:  
political moves**


a. At the special meeting called by the Soviets this morning in the Berlin Air Safety Center, the Soviet representative merely repeated previous Soviet statements on operation of the corridors.

b. The USSR appears to be arguing that we cannot fly in the corridors without prior Soviet approval of each flight, and is by implication threatening to withdraw from the Berlin Air Safety Center.

c. We see this deliberate raising of tensions, and the hints that Khrushchev may show up in Geneva next month even if Western leaders do not, as two aspects of a play designed to force an early summit.

**3. Soviet-US relations:  
other developments**

a. In a meeting called by the Soviets in Geneva yesterday, their delegate urged that a nuclear test agreement be reached prior to the disarmament conference. He gave no indications of a change in the Soviet position.



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**4. French cool to  
disarmament conference**

Couve de Murville told Gavin Tuesday that they "very likely" would not attend.

5. Laos

Souvanna is now definitely  
scheduled to arrive in Luang Prabang  
tomorrow afternoon.

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6. Indonesia-West  
New Guinea

a. Dutch Foreign Minister Luns,  
who still takes a more rigid line  
than other Dutch officials, says the  
Netherlands is considering sending  
"very sizeable" troop reinforcements  
to New Guinea. Our Embassy has no  
evidence to support this.

c. Sukarno, who has long felt  
uneasy over army chief Nasution's  
political power, is trying to maneuver  
him out of his army job, while re-  
taining him as Minister of National  
Security. This would not weaken the  
army's opposition to the Communists,  
but might lessen its ability to hold  
Sukarno to a middle path.

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d. The Communists have scheduled  
a Party Congress for March. Like most  
Asian parties, the Indonesian party has  
a strong pro-Chinese faction; high-level  
Soviet and Chinese delegations will  
probably show up to battle for in-  
fluence.

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7. Soviets and Chinese greet twelfth anniversary of their treaty of alliance with something less than enthusiasm

In perfunctory ceremonies, the Chinese implied that Khrushchev rather than Mao was responsible for weakening of the alliance. The Soviets remarked that the USSR's great military power would be used to protect only "friendly" Socialist countries. Last year they had repeated Khrushchev's pledge of 1958 that the USSR will consider "an attack on China as an attack on the Soviet Union."

8. Congo

a. Since Adoula's return to Leopoldville, he has seemed to act with more confidence, and has publicly taken a somewhat more rigid line toward Tshombé.

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9. USSR will train and equip new brigade for Ghanaian army

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**NOTES**

- A. We do not see any great significance in Castro's relinquishment of the presidency of the National Land Reform Institute.
- B. There was a sharp increase in Soviet personnel in North Vietnam during November and December of last year; 50X1
- C. The Cubans have approached the Japanese on improving trade relations; they told the Japanese they were seeking to do so with Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile as well. 50X1
- D. The Turkish government has begun a new series of arrests of Menderes supporters; this will please the army but will not contribute to political stability.

### **WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS--14 FEBRUARY 1962**

No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.

BERLIN: The recent Soviet efforts to impose limitations on Allied use of the air corridors appear to stem from political rather than military motives. Such harassments can be expected to continue; however, Communist military activity does not suggest that the Communists expect to risk military confrontation over Berlin in the immediate future.

LAOS: Current indications do not point to an all-out Communist offensive. The available evidence indicates that the Communists will continue their limited military pressures on Phoumi toward formation of a coalition government on Communist terms.

SOUTH VIETNAM: The pattern of Viet Cong subversive and small-scale military activity remains unchanged.

**DOCUMENTS OF INTEREST**

I.  50X1

II.  50X1

**THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**